By: Rizky Widian, Ph.D., Lecturer in IR, Researcher – PACIS
The intensifying rivalry between China and the United States (US) has led many to argue that smaller powers are losing their space to maneuver. Since the Trump administration opted for unilateral trade policies and coercive practices abroad, it has become increasingly common to argue that hedging is no longer a viable strategy and that regions like Southeast Asia will inevitably fall into China’s strategic domain. While it is reasonable to think that great power competition has narrowed strategic space, concluding that Southeast Asian countries will align tightly with China is both analytically premature and empirically questionable.
To be sure, the constraints facing smaller states are real. Growing US–China rivalry raises the costs of ambiguity, and Washington’s willingness to act unilaterally has created uncertainty about its long-term commitments. However, reduced room for maneuver does not necessarily dictate alignment outcomes. Indeed, strategic pressure limits smaller powers options, but it does not determine which option states will ultimately choose. Particularly in Southeast Asia, the assumption that shrinking space leads naturally to bandwagoning behaviour with China overlooks persistent security tensions and deep economic realities.
Unsolved Security Problems & Economic Needs
On the security front, several key Southeast Asian states continue to experience serious and unresolved disputes with China in the South China Sea. As a reflection of this situation, Vietnam has cautiously introduced contingency elements into its Four Nos policy, while the Philippines has maintained its security alignment with the US even under Duterte’s administrations that was less sympathetic to Washington. These patterns suggest both a perceived security threat from China and ongoing attempts to preserve strategic counterweights despite mounting pressure. Hence, it is difficult to see these patterns as an indication of resignation to Chinese dominance.
Economically, the case for alignment with China is even less straightforward. Southeast Asian economies are integrated into Chinese supply chains through, in particular, imports of intermediate and capital goods. At the same time, their export profiles are quite diversified, with some flowing toward the US and other advanced markets in considerable shares. In practical terms, Southeast Asia needs China as a supplier of goods and the US as a consumer of their exports. This dual dependence creates incentives for balance (or to hedge), not exclusive alignment.
Alignment as a Conditional and Contingent Outcome
That said, the possibility of exclusive alignment cannot be ruled out. If Southeast Asian states were to align tightly with China, Beijing would need to absorb a far greater share of their export output to make such alignment economically viable. Without access to large alternative markets, shifting decisively toward China would entail significant economic costs. In this sense, alignment is not simply a matter of dependence, but of substitution. Unless China can replace the US market, aligning against Washington remains economically unattractive. This economic logic is further complicated by security considerations, particularly the unresolved question of whether China and Southeast Asian states are prepared to settle their South China Sea disputes peacefully.
Ultimately, decisive alignment in Southeast Asia is more likely to be driven by shock than by gradual pressure. Major disruptions such as a violent conflict in the Taiwan Strait or a full-scale military confrontation in the South China Sea might push regional states to abandon strategic flexibility. Until such crisis occurs, however, Southeast Asia is unlikely to become anyone’s “domain.” Instead, it will continue navigating a constrained but deliberate middle path, shaped as much by economic and regional security factors as by strategic rivalry.
