Author: Grace Harding *
The frontlines of radicalisation are no longer found in remote training camps; they are in the glow of a smartphone. In Southeast Asia, home to one of the world’s most digitally interconnected youth populations, social media use among the 15–24 age demographic now exceeds 90%. This digital saturation has created a borderless threat that intelligence agencies are fundamentally struggling to map.
For two decades, Australia and Southeast Asia have been trapped in a counterterrorism “rut”. Since the 2002 Bali bombings, our strategy has been clinical: dismantle hierarchical cells like Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf through surveillance, shared intelligence, and kinetic action. According to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, this joint “security-first” model was once a strategic necessity. But as we enter 2026, it is clear that our opponents have changed while our strategies have remained dangerously stagnant.
The frightening truth is that we are no longer fighting organised cells alone; we are fighting a pervasive sense of unbelonging that recruiters exploit with surgical precision. If we continue to treat this as a purely security-centric problem, we are not solving the crisis; we are merely managing the symptoms while the disease spreads.
The Past Doesn’t Justify Today’s Failures
Yes, dismantling organised terror cells through joint intelligence operations was critical twenty years ago. Australia’s partnership with Indonesia, sharing data and conducting coordinated raids, has undoubtedly saved thousands of lives. However, that success has become a crutch. It has allowed policymakers to cling to outdated frameworks that prioritise catching bad actors over preventing young people from radicalisation in the first place (Australia’s Counter- Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy 2025). The intelligence-first mindset has its place, but also a glaring flaw: it is inherently reactive. Intelligence agencies can track a phone call or a money trail, but they cannot track the slow, agonising process of social alienation. By the time a teenager is on the radar of a security agency, the ‘battle for the heart’ has already been lost.
Today, extremists don’t wait for recruits to find them in mosques or community centres. They search online, within digital subcultures teeming with hatred, conspiracies, and disinformation. The terrorist threat of 2026 is decentralised and gamified. Small micro-extremist cells now operate below the radar, often motivated by local grievances and identity insecurity (INFID 2024). The numbers are sobering. Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) reported detecting over 6,402 instances of radical online content between January and August 2025 alone. This isn’t just passive propaganda; it is a sophisticated recruitment drive. A 2025 Soufan Center report highlights the rise of Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE) among youth as young as 12, often radicalised through gaming platforms like Roblox and Discord. In Indonesia, police confirmed that at least 110 children aged 10–18 have been recruited by extremist networks across 23 provinces in the last year.
This is where the security-first model fails most spectacularly. You cannot arrest your way out of a TikTok algorithm. When we rely solely on surveillance, we often push these conversations into encrypted digital shadows like Telegram, where they fester without any counter-narrative to challenge them. This failure isn’t theoretical; it is a ticking time bomb.
Indonesia’s deradicalisation programs provide a case study in missed opportunities. For years, these efforts have been stuck in the last century, fixating almost exclusively on religious re- education (Syamsuddin 2021). The assumption is that if you ‘correct’ someone’s theology, they will stop being a threat. This ignores the complex social fabric of radicalisation. Many young recruits aren’t looking for a new religion; they are looking for a job, a sense of purpose, and a community that values them. The threat is truly regional and fits within the ASEAN Plan of Action (2025). In Singapore, the Internal Security Department recently issued orders against a 15-year-old and a 17-year-old for self-radicalisation, while in Malaysia, 2025 saw a surge in youth-led nihilistic attacks. In regions where economic despair is high and social infrastructure is crumbling, extremist groups offer a package deal: a paycheck, a brotherhood, and a heroic identity.
The most effective weapon against violent extremism isn’t a drone; it is social connection. To operationalise this, Australia and its ASEAN neighbours must pivot from reaction to resilience through three policy pillars:
- Digital Literacy as National Defence: We must stop treating the internet as a surveillance zone and start treating it as a frontline for education. Australia should export its “eSafety Commissioner” model, adapted for Southeast Asian contexts, to help local communities build digital immunity. The UNODC’s 2025 Regional Workshop in Singapore emphasised that protecting the ‘terminally online’ requires ethical digital literacy, not just blocking content.
- Economic Anchoring and Livelihood: Socioeconomic despair is the recruiter’s greatest ally. Australia’s 2025-26 ODA Budget includes record aid, which must be laser-focused on vocational training and job creation in radicalisation hotspots.
- Empowering Credible Voices: Real change happens when governments yield space to local leaders and youth mentors. Recent Indonesian initiatives using sport for social cohesion show that community-led intervention is far more effective than state re- education.
The stakes could not be higher. If Australia continues to play catch-up, it will forever be reacting to crises instead of preventing them. We risk repeating the mistakes of the past if we continue to equate more surveillance with more safety. In reality, more surveillance without more social cohesion only creates a more paranoid and divided society. ASEAN’s regional strategy recognises the need to mobilise youth, but these commitments mean little without genuine political will from regional leaders like Australia. We must demand accountability not just for ‘plots foiled’, but for communities strengthened. We must measure our success by the level of social trust in our most vulnerable neighbourhoods.
The future of counterterrorism isn’t about watching people; it’s about bringing them in from the cold.
*Students Exchange in International Relations in Southeast Asia class; Professor: Ratih Indraswari, Ph.D.
