Author: Emilie Mrabti*
Higher education globalization often illustrates political ambitions of a region, as we can see, for example, with the Erasmus program in the European Union (EU). Indeed, created in 1987, the Erasmus program is a program aiming to increase student exchange, volunteering, and internships across Europe. With more than 26, 2 billions of budget, this program finances the exchange mobility of billions of students each year. According to theannual report of Erasmus+, in 2024, 1.5 billion students had benefited from the program. The main goal of this European initiative is to promote inclusion, cultural exchange, and European integration.
In Asia, and specifically in the ASEAN cooperation, educational programs also exist, like ASEAN International Mobility for Students (AIMS) or ASEAN University Network (AUN). These initiatives emerged between 2000 and 2010 and offer the opportunity for thousands of students from an ASEAN member country to study in another ASEAN member country every year. In 2028, for example, according to the Study on Enhancing Intra-ASEAN University Student Mobility, 22,770 outbound students from ASEAN members are studying Iin ntra-ASEAN. Yet these programs are much more fragmented and elitist than in the EU. Thus, are these differences between Erasmus+ and ASEAN’s programs simply the reflection of different integration degrees in both of these cooperations, or are they the sign of deeper limits of ASEAN’s political integration project?
This essay argues that the ASEAN members are less integrated in the association and how it fails to overcome national sovereignty and maintain the internal inequality between the members, leading to the impossibility of creating an equivalence of the Erasmus+ program. It demonstrates how the Erasmus+ program is an integrated model, developed through supranational dynamics, while ASEAN’s mobility programs are fragmented and unequal, highlighting structural political issues (e.g., the issue of ASEAN integration). The final part will focus on the differences between the two organizations’ programs and what these differences reveal about them.
First of all, the Erasmus+ program is collectively created thanks to the supranational institutions of the EU to favor the integration and the identity of the union. This program is institutionalized and collectively financed by all the members of the EU. Indeed, the program has, since January 1st of 202,1 provided a legal framework and an official budget that is established not only as a punctual initiative but also as a perennial European policy. The budget for 2021 to 2027 of the program, up to 26.2 billion euros, is directly managed by the EU’s institutions, and the legal framework has been written in accordance with the work programs adopted by the European Commission.
Moreover, the objectives of the programs are clearly defined and are in concordance with the EU’s goals, as it aims to favor social inclusion and the development of key competences in domains like education, formation, youth, and sport. On top of that, the program, thanks to the common legal framework, benefits from the common academic harmonization in the university across the EU member states and is based on EU tools [that ensure the] transparency and recognition of skills, competences and qualifications, including: Europass; the European Qualifications Framework (EQF); the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS); […] and the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA). This favors the exchange and the integration, and equality between the exchange students participating in the program.
This program also includes a large access and a redistribution system. Indeed, all the 27 countries of the EU can benefit from the Erasmus+ program, and between 2014 and 2024, more than 230,000 projects have been financed by the program. Erasmus+ also puts the accent on inclusion, as it targets disadvantaged and vulnerable audiences with projects like DiscoverEU. The program has also created online language support programs like OLS to help students overcome the language barrier that often serves as the main obstacle to their participation.
Finally, the program is also a tool for the EU to create a democratized and important mobility within the EU and thus to create a regional identity, cooperation, and inclusion. Indeed, the program to reduce the financial obstacle allows financial support in accordance with the social and economic background of the students participating in the program. All students can benefit from a menstrual allowance between 250 and 600 euros, and some students can ask to receive a scholarship to support their costs during their exchange. This favors the integration and offers an opportunity to students from all the EU members (richer and poorer) and reinforces the idea of common identity and solidarity in the union, as all the students can benefit equally from the opportunity in the European Union.
On the other hand, ASEAN mobility programs reveal an approach marked by fragmentation and inequality. Indeed, ASEAN does not possess a single common mobility program equivalent to the EU’s Erasmus+ in terms of inclusivity and access.
First of all, the initiatives are diverse and grouped through AIMS, the ASEAN AUN, and various bilateral agreements. This fragmentation signals the limits of cooperation and a perceived lack of regional ambition and cooperation. On top of that, AIMS is noted as the main regional initiative, but its reach is still limited in terms of participating countries and the number of students involved, operating under an intergovernmental management structure. Moreover, the mobility system within ASEAN is criticized for being elitist and unequal, frequently reproducing existing internal disparities rather than correcting them. Participation is heavily directed towards more developed countries, like Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, or Malaysia. Indeed, the access remains low for students from less advanced economies such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. In 2019 more than 55.961 Indonesian students studied abroad compared to only 7.562 for Cambodia and 9.202 for Laos. This imbalance is due to the low number of students involved and to the financial and linguistic obstacles. Thus, the mobility within ASEAN programs is consequently highly unbalanced and based on countries’ incomes and national capacities. Instead of favoring inclusion and common identity, it reinforces the differences and the fragmentation inside ASEAN.
Moreover, one major impediment to establishing a comprehensive regional exchange program is the political culture known as the “ASEAN Way.” This culture is defined by a commitment to consensus, flexibility, and the strict principle of non-interference and absolute national sovereignty. This political environment prevents the creation of a legally binding framework or the necessary harmonization required for mass mobility. Critics argue that the central norms of national sovereignty and non-interference result in institutions that are weak and not supranational, ultimately impeding the implementation of a true “Asian Erasmus.”
*Students Exchange in International Relations in Southeast Asia class; Professor: Ratih Indraswari, Ph.D.
